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Abstract
Communications devices intended for use in security-
critical applications must be rigorously evaluated to
ensure they preserve data confidentiality. This pro-
cess includes tracing the flow of classified informa-
tion through the device’s circuitry. Previous work
has shown how this can be done using graph analysis
techniques for each of the device’s distinct operating
modes. However, such analyses overlook potential in-
formation flow between modes, via components that
store information in one mode and release it in an-
other. Here we show how graph-based analyses can
be extended to allow for information flow through se-
quences of consecutive modes.
1 Introduction
Electronic communications devices safeguard classi-
fied information in government and military computer
networks. In particular, ‘domain separation’ devices
allow the flow of information between high and low-
security networks to be controlled. Examples of such
devices include: data diodes, which allow one-way in-
formation flow only; multi-computer switches, which
allow peripheral devices to be shared between dif-
ferent domains; context filters, which constrict infor-
mation flow; and cryptographic devices, which allow
transmission of classified information over insecure
networks.
Before such a device can be deployed, however, it
must be carefully evaluated to ensure that it main-
tains data confidentiality. Such evaluations involve a
detailed analysis of the device’s design and construc-
tion (Bishop 2003, Ch. 21), as prescribed by interna-
tional security standards (Herrmann 2003).
Previous work has shown how information flow can
be traced through the circuitry of domain-separation
devices to see if there are unintended data pathways
from a high-security domain to a low-security one
(Rae & Fidge 2005a, Rae & Fidge 2005b, McComb
& Wildman 2005). Because a device will typically
send data to different destinations in different modes,
such analyses must take each of the device’s different
operating modes into account. These include ‘failure’
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modes in which a faulty component alters the flow of
information.
However, previous analyses fail to identify unin-
tended information-flow pathways created by changes
in operating mode. A potential security risk may be
caused by components within a device that can store
information in one mode and release it in another.
It is then possible for classified data en route to a
high-security destination to be accidentally diverted
to a low-security domain when the device’s mode is
changed.
Here we use a series of worked examples to show
how a simple extension to existing graph-theoretic
analysis techniques allows us to identify potential se-
curity leaks caused by mode changes. This is done by
allowing information-flow pathways to be defined not
only as those in which data is transmitted in a partic-
ular operating mode, but also as those in which data
is communicated between different operating modes,
providing the information flows intersect at compo-
nents that may store and forward data.
2 Previous Work
International standards such as the Common Crite-
ria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
define the need to undertake detailed analyses of com-
munications devices intended for use in high-security
computer networks (Common Criteria 1999). In-
evitably, however, general standards like these offer
broad guidelines only, so much work is required to
put them into practice (Herrmann 2003).
Our own research has been dedicated to automat-
able evaluation techniques for domain-separation de-
vices. In previous work we have shown how to analyse
electronic circuitry to identify information flow paths
(Rae & Fidge 2005a, Rae & Fidge 2005b), and have
implemented this theory in a practical tool (McComb
& Wildman 2005). However, this work was limited to
exploring information flow occurring within a single
operating mode of the device. Behaviours that span
modes were not considered.
In the context of safety-critical, rather than
security-critical, systems the ‘mode logic’ of em-
bedded controllers has been well explored elsewhere
(Miller 1998, Paynter 1996). Although similar in
motivation to our research, this work is not con-
cerned with information flow, but rather with the
need to model the way the system may change op-
erating modes, in order to prove that no undesirable
sequences of mode changes are possible.
3 Motivation
In previous research we explained how the schematic
circuit diagram of a communications device could be
treated as an information flow graph for the purposes
of security evaluation (Rae & Fidge 2005b). Discrete
components such as logic gates and microprocessor
chips are treated as nodes, and the wiring connect-
ing them as arcs. The way each type of component
connects its inputs to its outputs is defined for each
of the device’s operating modes. The device’s circuit
diagram is then modelled as an adjacency matrix of
the following form.
outputs
inputs modes
Each row represents a connection acting as an input
and each column a connection acting as an output.
Based on the behaviour of the various components,
the cells in the matrix are populated with sets of op-
erating modes, possibly empty, defining the particular
modes in which the corresponding input and output
are connected.
Connectivity across the whole circuit is then de-
fined as the transitive closure of the adjacency matrix.
The security evaluator can then easily see whether
there is any information flow from those inputs to the
device which come from a high-security domain and
those outputs which lead to a low-security domain.
Importantly, the transitive closure is calculated
under the assumption that two adjacent arcs are con-
nected only if they are both ‘active’ in the same mode.
Since a circuit diagram is usually fully-connected, this
assumption limits the information flow analysis to re-
alistic cases.
Although adequate for components such as logic
gates, that can be modelled as if they ‘instanta-
neously’ transfer information from their inputs to
their outputs, this assumption is not always satisfac-
tory. If it possible for a particular component to store
information when the device is one mode, and subse-
quently release the information when the device is in
another mode, then classified data may flow through
the device in a way that will not be identified by a
mode-specific analysis. Therefore, our goal below is
to extend the approach to allow for the possibility
that some components, such as memory chips and
flip flops, can transfer information from one operat-
ing mode to another.
4 Tracing Information Flow Through Mode
Changes
To do this we must extend the notion that a com-
ponent connects its inputs to its outputs in a partic-
ular mode to allow for components that receive in-
formation in one mode and release it in a subsequent
mode. Therefore, rather than reasoning about partic-
ular modes of the device, we must consider sequences
of consecutive modes.
Let M,N, . . . represent distinct operating modes
of a device. In practice these may be ‘normal’ be-
haviours, fault modes or both. We firstly intro-
duce mode sequences within angled brackets, e.g.,
〈M,N,O, P 〉, to model the notion that the device has
switched between the particular sequence of modes,
in the order shown.
To model the mode-specific way a component con-
nects its inputs to its outputs we also need a special
operator for joining mode sequences end-to-end. This
is denoted here by ‘X ⊕ Y ’, which joins (non-empty)
mode sequences X and Y provided that the last mode
in sequence X is the same as the first mode in se-
quence Y .
〈M, . . . , O, P 〉 ⊕ 〈P,Q, . . . , S〉
= 〈M, . . . , O, P,Q, . . . , S〉 (1)
Sequences whose last/first modes don’t match cannot
be joined. For example, 〈M, . . . , P 〉⊕〈Q, . . . , S〉 does
not produce a valid mode sequence.
To model components that may exchange informa-
tion in any mode, we also introduce mode ‘wildcards’,
denoted ‘?’ that match any mode.
〈M, . . . , O, P 〉 ⊕ 〈?,Q, . . . , S〉
= 〈M, . . . , O, P,Q, . . . , S〉 (2)
Similarly for the symmetric case with the wildcard at
the end of the first sequence. Notice that, given this
rule, we can use the sequence 〈?, ?〉 as a ‘connector’
to join any two mode sequences.
Since it is unhelpful to say that a device switches
from a given mode P to the same mode P , we also as-
sume that duplicated, non-wildcard modes are always
compressed.
〈M, . . . , O, P, P,Q, . . . , S〉
= 〈M, . . . , O, P,Q, . . . , S〉 (3)
We then follow our previous approach (Rae &
Fidge 2005b) of populating the adjacency matrix with
the mode-specific connections implied by the individ-
ual components in the device and performing matrix
multiplications to calculate the transitive closure and
achieve an end-to-end connectivity analysis. Now,
however, the cells of the adjacency matrix contain sets
of mode sequences, rather than just sets of modes.
Let Z be an N × N adjacency matrix. Let Z(i,j)
be the value in the cell in Z’s ith row and jth column.
Then we define the square Z2 as a matrix in which
the cell in the ith row and jth column is calculated
as follows.
Z2(i,j) =
⋃
1≤k≤N
{s⊕ t | s ∈ Z(i,k) ∧ t ∈ Z(k,j)} (4)
In other words, if information can flow from input i to
output k via mode sequence s, and information can
flow from input k to output j via mode sequence t,
then information can flow from input i to output j
via mode sequence s ⊕ t (provided that sequences s
and t can be joined using Rules 1 to 3 above). The
transitive closure of a graph can be found by squaring
its adjacency matrix until it stops changing.
To illustrate the technique and its properties, the
following sections present four distinct examples in
which ‘inter-mode’ information flow may occur.
5 Example: A Device With a Modal,
Buffered Component
Here we consider an example where a component with
memory transmits information in different directions
in different operating modes. An abstract view of the
device of interest is shown in Figure 1. It comprises
four components, A, B, C and D, which act as se-
rial interface converters, and a switching component
X, which directs the flow of information. Such a de-
vice may, for instance, form part of a multi-computer
switch, used to allow peripheral devices to be shared
between different security domains, while still main-
taining separation of data.
We assume that component X has two different
operating modes, M and N , selected by a physical
switch on the device (not shown in the figure). In
mode M information flows along connections e, f , g
and h, via components B, X and A. In mode N in-
formation flows along connections i, j, k and l, via
components D, X and C. Connections e and h in-
terface to a high-security domain, while connections i
Table 1: Adjacency matrix for the switching device using global modes
e f g h i j k l
e {M}
f {M}
g {M}
h
i {N}
j {N}
k {N}
l
Table 2: Connectivity matrix for the switching device using global modes
e f g h i j k l
e {M} {M} {M}
f {M} {M}
g {M}
h
i {N} {N} {N}
j {N} {N}
k {N}
l
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Figure 1: A buffered switching device
and l interface to a low-security domain. We also as-
sume that component X contains a data buffer, to
smooth the flow of data packets through the device.
To evaluate such a device’s security properties we
must determine whether there are any information-
flow pathways from the high-security domain to the
low-security one in any operating mode. We first per-
form the analysis using the previous mode-specific ap-
proach (Rae & Fidge 2005b) to illustrate its weakness.
Table 1 shows the initial adjacency matrix as pop-
ulated by the security evaluator, showing connectiv-
ity through the individual components in different
modes. For instance, it says that information flows
from e to f , from f to g and from g to h in mode M ,
as per the above description of the device’s behaviour.
Similarly for mode N . All unoccupied cells are as-
sumed to contain the empty set of modes. We omit
the cells on the diagonal since it is unhelpful to note
that an arc is connected to itself.
To analyse the device’s overall connectivity, we
then perform matrix multiplications until a fixed
point is reached, populating each cell (i, j) with the
intersection of the mode sets from cells (i, k) and (k, j)
(Rae & Fidge 2005b). This is consistent with the no-
tion that components must be in the same mode to
interact. The resulting connectivity matrix is shown
in Table 2.
This analysis correctly shows that information
may flow from e to h in mode M and from i to l in
mode N . Moreover, the two clusters of occupied cells
in Table 2 clearly suggests that the device successfully
achieves domain-separation in its two modes.
Unfortunately, this analysis completely overlooks
the possibility that component X retains information
between modes. To solve this we redo the analysis
using mode sequences as defined in Section 4 above.
Table 3 shows our initial population of the ad-
jacency matrix using mode sequences. As before it
includes the explicit information flow in operating
modes M and N . However, this time the security
evaluator has chosen to use ‘mode wildcard’ sequences
to indicate that buffered component X may forward
information received on input j in one mode to out-
put g in another mode. Similarly for input f and
output k. (We have added only those additional con-
nections created by component X’s ability to store-
and-forward information in different modes. Adding
‘wildcards’ to the (f, g) and (j, k) cells would also be
reasonable but does not change the outcome in this
case.)
Table 4 then shows the matrix after multiplying
twice (at which point it stops changing) using Rule 4
above. This time the (i, h) cell tells us that informa-
tion may flow between these two arcs when compo-
nent X’s mode is switched from N to M . This is an
unexpected but harmless behaviour of the device.
Of much more concern is that the (e, l) cell shows
potential information flow when the mode changes
from M to N . This is especially disturbing since
this is a previously unsuspected flow from the high-
security domain to the low-security one.
In this way the security evaluator is alerted to a po-
tentially dangerous flow of information and the need
to study this pathway in more depth. For instance, if
it can be proven that component X’s buffer is cleared
Table 3: Adjacency matrix for the switching device using mode sequences
e f g h i j k l
e {〈M〉}
f {〈M〉} {〈?, ?〉}
g {〈M〉}
h
i {〈N〉}
j {〈?, ?〉} {〈N〉}
k {〈N〉}
l
Table 4: Connectivity matrix for the switching device using mode sequences
e f g h i j k l
e {〈M〉} {〈M〉} {〈M〉} {〈M,?〉} {〈M,N ]〉}
f {〈M〉} {〈M〉} {〈?, ?〉} {〈?,N〉}
g {〈M〉}
h
i {〈N, ?〉} {〈N,M〉} {〈N〉} {〈N〉} {〈N〉}
j {〈?, ?〉} {〈?,M〉} {〈N〉} {〈N〉}
k {〈N〉}
l
every time the device changes from mode M to N
then the device may still be considered secure. If not,
however, it may need to be rejected.
The transitive closure also produces ‘wildcard’
mode sequences in the (i, g), (j, h), (e, k) and (f, l)
cells, denoting potential information flow along these
paths in different modes, but since none of these paths
both begin and end in the device’s environment they
are of little security interest. Generally, we are inter-
ested only in pathways leading from a high-security
domain, or some other source of classified informa-
tion, to a low-security domain.
6 Example: A Device with a Non-Moded
Buffered Component
In this section we consider an example where the com-
ponent that retains information between modes is not
itself affected by mode changes, but another compo-
nent that uses it is.
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Figure 2: A cryptographic device
Figure 2 shows a (highly abstract) view of a cryp-
tographic device. It connects a high-security com-
puter to a low-security network. The device has two
modes, encryption E and decryption D. In encryp-
tion mode E plaintext messages are read from the
computer via input b, encrypted by processor A, us-
ing memory chip B to temporarily store each block of
the resulting ciphertext, and these are then sent to the
network via output d. In decryption mode D cipher-
text messages are read from the network via input c,
decrypted by processor A, using memory chip B to
temporarily store each block of the resulting plain-
text, and these are then sent to the computer via
output a. In practice, such devices are used in pairs,
allowing computers in two different high-security do-
mains to communicate over a low-security network.
Each device must thus perform both encryption and
decryption functions to support bidirectional commu-
nication. The device’s overall mode, encryption or
decryption, is controlled by signals (not shown) sent
to processor A from either the local or remote high-
security domain.
Once again, we first attempt to evaluate the device
using the old approach. Table 5 shows the security
evaluator’s population of the adjacency matrix, based
on our understanding of the way components A and B
work. To model the fact that information can be writ-
ten to and subsequently read from memory chip B in
either mode, we put both modes E and D into the
(e, f) cell. (This seems unnatural, because a memory
chip doesn’t normally have ‘modes’, but leaving the
cell empty would imply there is no information flow
through this component. Indeed, this dilemma high-
lights how poorly suited the previous approach is to
handling devices that store-and-forward information.)
The transitive closure after performing matrix
multiplications is shown in Table 6. It correctly
identifies information flow from c to a in decryption
mode D and from b to d in encryption mode E, both
of which are expected for this device.
Again, however, this approach fails to recognise
the possibility that information stored in the mem-
ory chip in one mode may accidently be released in
another mode. Therefore, we redo the analysis us-
ing mode sequences. To model the memory com-
ponent’s ability to connect information flow in any
Table 5: Adjacency matrix for the cryptographic device using global modes
a b c d e f
a
b {E}
c {D}
d
e {E,D}
f {D} {E}
Table 6: Connectivity matrix for the cryptographic device using global modes
a b c d e f
a
b {E} {E} {E}
c {D} {D} {D}
d
e {D} {E} {E,D}
f {D} {E}
pair of modes—because the memory chip itself is
not influenced by changes to the device’s encryp-
tion/decryption mode—we put a wildcard entry into
the (e, f) cell in Table 7.
The resulting transitive closure after matrix mul-
tiplication is shown in Table 8. This time the (b, a)
cell tells us that information put into memory in en-
cryption mode E could potentially be sent back to
the high-security domain in decryption mode D. Al-
though this is not an intended behaviour of the device,
it would be harmless from a security perspective.
More seriously, though, the (c, d) cell alerts us to
the danger that
1. processor A, in decryption mode, reads a cipher-
text message from input c,
2. it decrypts the ciphertext and stores the resulting
blocks of plaintext data in memory chip B via
arc e,
3. processor A’s mode is switched to encryption,
4. processor A reads the contents of memory com-
ponent B, via arc f , and sends the blocks of de-
crypted plaintext to the low-security domain via
output d.
This series of events would allow the device to decrypt
a ciphertext message received from the low-security
domain and send the resulting plaintext back to the
low-security domain!
Having been alerted to this risk, the security eval-
uator would be obliged to look for mitigations against
it. This would most likely require a careful analysis of
the software on processor A to ensure that it accesses
arrays in memory in a safe way or, better still, that
it completely clears the contents of memory chip B
when the mode changes from encryption to decryp-
tion.
7 Example: Combining Buffered and Modal
Modules
The next example demonstrates that the approach
has good compositional behaviour. In this case we
show that combining a buffered component with an
otherwise ‘secure’ modal circuit makes the overall de-
vice insecure in the presence of mode changes.
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Figure 3: A context filtering device
Figure 3 shows a (highly abstract) design for a
context filter. Such devices are used to restrict the
flow of information from a high-security domain to
a low-security one. In this case we assume the de-
vice has two operating modes, filter F and bypass B.
When the device is in filter mode it is intended to ac-
cept information from the high-security domain and
forward only data packets that satisfy some prede-
fined security criterion to the low-security domain.
When the device is in bypass mode information may
flow from the high-security to the low-security do-
main without restriction. (Bypass modes are typ-
ically needed in such devices to allow binary con-
trol data through while setting up communication
links.)
The device’s design consists of two main modules.
On the right is a modal (and essentially memoryless)
module in which component S directs the flow of in-
formation depending on whether the device is in by-
pass or filter mode. Component T is a simple merge
component (probably just an ‘or’ gate in practice).
Component U performs the filtering function, which
normally involves excising messages being sent from
the high-security domain to the low-security one if
they are not in some dictionary of allowed messages.
On the left of Figure 3 is a separate module containing
an unmoded input buffer R which is used to smooth
the flow of traffic into the filter.
The interesting aspect of this device is that, in
isolation, both the left and right-hand modules have
well-understood, ‘secure’ behaviours, but their com-
position in the presence of mode changes does not.
Table 7: Adjacency matrix for the cryptographic device using mode sequences
a b c d e f
a
b {〈E〉}
c {〈D〉}
d
e {〈?, ?〉}
f {〈D〉} {〈E〉}
Table 8: Connectivity matrix for the cryptographic device using mode sequences
a b c d e f
a
b {〈E,D〉} {〈E〉} {〈E〉} {〈E, ?〉}
c {〈D〉} {〈D,E〉} {〈D〉} {〈D, ?〉}
d
e {〈?,D〉} {〈?,E〉} {〈?, ?〉}
f {〈D〉} {〈E〉}
Table 9 shows our initial population of the adja-
cency matrix for this device using mode sequences.
In particular, the (a, b) cell shows that component R
can receive information in either mode B or F and
release it in any mode.
(Putting 〈?, ?〉 in this cell would have exactly the
same meaning, since the only two modes are B and F ,
but explicitly enumerating the modes for cells that
are on the outermost boundary of a diagram pro-
duces a more readable result. Another modelling
decision in this table is that the evaluator has cho-
sen to separately specify the two distinct modes in
which information is intended to flow through com-
ponent T , either from c to d in mode B or from f
to d in mode F . Although reasonable, we could
equally well take the view that this simple ‘or’ gate-
like component is essentially unmoded and put both
modes B and F in the (c, d) and (f, d) cells. This has
no significant impact on the overall example, how-
ever.)
Table 10 then shows the calculated connectivity
matrix. If we consider just the b to f rows and
columns, we can see the overall connectivity for the
right-hand module in Figure 3. In particular, the
(b, d) cell tells us that this unbuffered module is ‘se-
cure’ in the sense that information flows from end-to-
end only in modes B or F , as we expect from such a
device.
However, with the addition of buffered compo-
nent R (i.e., the ‘a’ row and column in Table 10)
we see that the device as a whole is not secure.
Specifically, the 〈F,B〉 sequence in the (a, d) cell
alerts us to the fact that information accumulated
in component R while the device is in filter mode F
can be subsequently released to the low-security
domain when the device is switched into bypass
mode B, and thus won’t get filtered as the operator
intended.
Once again, therefore, the security evaluator will
be obliged to carefully consider the device’s behaviour
when it switches from filter to bypass mode. Al-
though component S is the primary one concerned
with the device’s overall mode, we must ensure that
all data in component R is cleared when the mode is
changed. If this cannot be proven by more detailed
analysis of the device’s design it must be rejected as
insecure.
8 Example: Clearing a Buffered Component
In the preceding examples we have assumed a worst-
case scenario in which a buffered component may re-
lease any information acquired in previous modes. If,
however, we know that the buffer is cleared when cer-
tain mode changes occur we can incorporate this in-
formation in the adjacency matrix and thus eliminate
false positives from the connectivity analysis. Using
sets of mode sequences in the cells makes this pos-
sible because we can selectively omit sequences from
the sets when we know that this particular sequence
of modes never allows information flow.
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Figure 4: A keyboard switch
For example, consider the (highly abstract) design
for a keyboard switch in Figure 4. Its purpose is to
allow a single keyboard K to be shared between high-
security computer A and low-security computer B.
The switching device contains three components, a
‘mode switch’ S, and two microprocessors, P and Q,
for interfacing between the keyboard and the high and
low-security computers, respectively.
Table 9: Adjacency matrix for the filter device
a b c d e f
a {〈F, ?〉, 〈B, ?〉}
b {〈B〉} {〈F 〉}
c {〈B〉}
d
e {〈F 〉}
f {〈F 〉}
Table 10: Connectivity matrix for the filter device
a b c d e f
a {〈F, ?〉, 〈B, ?〉} {〈B〉, 〈F,B〉} {〈F 〉, 〈B〉,
〈F,B〉, 〈B,F 〉}
{〈F 〉, 〈B,F 〉} {〈F 〉, 〈B,F 〉}
b {〈B〉} {〈B〉, 〈F 〉} {〈F 〉} {〈F 〉}
c {〈B〉}
d
e {〈F 〉} {〈F 〉}
f {〈F 〉}
The device has two modes, H and L, where the
keyboard is connected to the high-security computer
and the low-security computer, respectively. The
mode of choice is controlled by the operator, using
a physical switch connected to component S, which
in turn sends appropriate control signals (not shown)
to the two microprocessors.
In such a device, component S does not physi-
cally disconnect the keyboard from the ‘disconnected’
computer, to avoid problems caused by the computer
detecting that its keyboard has been unplugged. In-
stead, the microprocessor linked to the disconnected
computer simulates the behaviour of the keyboard so
that both computers believe they have a dedicated
keyboard attached at all times. For instance, when
the device is in high-security mode H, microproces-
sor P acts as an interface between the keyboard and
computer A, while microprocessor Q simultaneously
simulates an idle keyboard for computer B.
Primary information flow through the keyboard
switch consists of keystrokes forwarded from the key-
board to whichever computer is ‘connected’, depend-
ing on the operating mode. However, the comput-
ers also send signals to the keyboard, to drive LED
and LCD displays, maintain the ‘Caps-Lock’ status,
and to store information about programmable func-
tion keys. This is why all arcs in Figure 4 are shown
as bidirectional. For instance, when the device is in
mode H, not only do keystrokes travel from compo-
nent K to component A, via components P and S,
but some data also travels from the high-security com-
puter to the keyboard in the reverse direction.
The presence of even a small memory buffer in the
keyboard thus introduces the danger of a covert chan-
nel via which classified information can be sent from
the high-security computer to the keyboard while the
device is in mode H and subsequently forwarded from
the keyboard to the low-security computer when the
device is in mode L. Indeed, undertaking a connec-
tivity analysis of this device, using ‘wildcard connec-
tors’ to model information flow through the keyboard,
would reveal that all the components in this device are
potentially connected.
In this example, however, we wish to introduce the
additional knowledge that a safeguard has been built
into the device. Assume that the device has been
engineered so that when it is switched from mode H
to mode L, microprocessor P instructs the keyboard
to clear all of its memory buffers.
We can incorporate this knowledge into our model
as shown by the adjacency matrix in Table 11. In-
stead of putting ‘〈?, ?〉’ connectors into the (e, f) and
(f, e) cells, we have instead included only the possibil-
ity that information flows through the keyboard when
the mode changes from L to H. Omitting the 〈H,L〉
sequence from these cells models our assumption that
information flow is prevented when switching from
mode H to mode L.
(Also note that component S is assumed to suc-
cessfully keep the high and low-security data streams
separate. There is no information flow between arcs a
and d or between arcs b and c.)
The resulting transitive closure in Table 12 then
shows that this device can be considered secure
thanks to the assumption we have made about clear-
ing the buffer. The (b, a) cell shows that information
may flow from the low-security computer to the high-
security one when the mode is switched from L to H,
but this is harmless. Most importantly, the (a, b) cell
is empty. Even though the (a, e) cell shows that infor-
mation may flow from the high-security computer to
the keyboard in modeH, and the (f, b) cell shows that
information may flow from the keyboard to the low-
security computer in mode L, our deliberate omission
of a 〈H,L〉 link in the (e, f) cell successfully captured
the notion that that the keyboard does not leak clas-
sified data in this design.
9 Conclusion
Evaluating information flow through communications
devices intended for secure applications is both te-
dious and intellectually taxing. Our research is devis-
ing ways of automating various aspects of the prob-
lem. In this short paper we have described an im-
provement to previous analysis techniques which will
help highlight potential security problems in devices
which possess both different operating modes and the
ability to temporarily store classified information be-
tween modes.
Although calculation of connectivity matrices is
readily automatable, population of the adjacency ma-
Table 11: Adjacency matrix for the keyboard switch
a b c d e f
a {〈H〉}
b {〈L〉}
c {〈H〉} {〈H〉}
d {〈L〉} {〈L〉}
e {〈H〉} {〈L,H〉}
f {〈L〉} {〈L,H〉}
Table 12: Connectivity matrix for the keyboard switch
a b c d e f
a {〈H〉} {〈H〉}
b {〈L,H〉} {〈L,H〉} {〈L〉} {〈L,H〉} {〈L〉}
c {〈H〉} {〈H〉}
d {〈L,H〉} {〈L〉} {〈L,H〉} {〈L,H〉} {〈L〉}
e {〈H〉} {〈H〉} {〈L,H〉}
f {〈L,H〉} {〈L〉} {〈L,H〉} {〈L〉} {〈L,H〉}
trix used as a starting point inevitably relies on a de-
gree of skill from the security evaluator to model as-
sumed device characteristics properly. Including too
many modes in the cells will produce false positives,
while omitting modes in which information is actu-
ally transmitted through a component runs the more
serious risk of overlooking security problems. If in
doubt about how to model a particular component,
therefore, the evaluator would be best advised to put
in too many modes, rather than too few.
All of the examples presented above were trivial
block-diagram abstractions of the types of devices we
normally consider. In practice, information security
evaluations are based on circuitry schematics with
dozens of distinct components. Such evaluations are
practical only with tool support. We have already
built a software tool capable of analysing circuit-level
system descriptions (McComb & Wildman 2005) and
now plan to extend it with the analysis capability de-
scribed above.
In future work, this general area of research can be
extended in two directions. Firstly, since we treat cir-
cuitry merely as a connectivity graph, the approach
can also be applied to whole communications net-
works, not just single communications devices. Also,
we plan to extend the type of analysis described above
to embedded software running on microprocessors
within communications devices, since embedded code
has a major influence on the transfer of information
between modes.
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